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Abstract 
Remembering the past and envisioning the future rely on episodic memory which enables 
mental time travel. Studies in young adults indicate that past and future thinking share 
common cognitive and neural underpinnings. No imaging data is yet available in healthy aged 
subjects. Using fMRI, we scanned older subjects while they remembered personal events (PP: 
last 12 months) or envisioned future plans (FP: next 12 months). Behaviorally, both time-
periods were comparable in terms of visual search strategy, emotion, frequency of rehearsal 
and recency of the last evocation. However, PP were more episodic, engaged a higher state of 
autonoetic consciousness and mental visual images were clearer and more numerous than FP. 
Neuroimaging results revealed a common network of activation (posterior cingulate cortex, 
precuneus, prefrontal cortex, hippocampus) reflecting the use of similar cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, the episodic nature of PP depended on hippocampal and visuo-spatial 
activations (occipital and angular gyri), while, for FP, it depended on the inferior frontal and 
lateral temporal gyri, involved in semantic memory retrieval. The common neural network 
and behavior suggests that healthy aged subjects thought about their future prospects in the 
past. The contribution of retrospective thinking into the future that engages the same network 
as the one recruited when remembering the past is discussed. Within this network, differential 
recruitment of specific areas highlights the episodic distinction between past and future 
mental time travel. 
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Introduction 
Episodic memory is the only memory system that allows individuals to mentally travel in 
subjective time, into either the past or the future (Tulving, 2002, 2005). This ability depends 
on autonoetic consciousness which mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence 
and identity in subjective time. Converging lines of evidence from different fields of research 
indicate that remembering the past or envisioning the future share common cognitive and 
neural underpinnings. First, developmental studies suggest that the level of awareness for 
episodic remembering and the ability to identify with future interests develops around ages 
three to four (Wheeler et al., 1997; Atance & O’Neil, 2001; Levine, 2004). Second, age-
related changes seem to affect similarly the quality of past and future mental evocations, with 
older adults generating fewer details for past and future events compared to younger adults 
(Addis et al., 2008). Third, neuropsychological case studies have shown that patients with 
hippocampal lesions have difficulties in remembering their personal past, but also in 
foreseeing their personal future (patient KC, Tulving, 1985; patient DB, Klein et al., 2002; 
Hassabis et al., 2007a), their productions lacking in episodic details compared to age-matched 
controls (Addis et al., 2009; Gamboz et al., 2010). Fourth, certain phenomenological 
characteristics similarly affect past and future mental thinking, such as positive emotional 
valence and temporally close events which are associated with a stronger feeling of re-
experiencing or pre-experiencing (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Addis et al., 
2008; Gamboz et al., in press). Most recently, a growing number of neuroimaging studies 
detect a common neural network when thinking about the past or the future (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009). 
Main results from the neuroimaging literature indicate a striking overlap between past and 
future thinking, especially during the elaboration phase, attributable to common cognitive 
processes (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007b; 
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D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Botzung et al., 2008; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Weiler et al., 2010). 
Indeed, past and future representations are intimately linked to the self, mediated, in 
particular, by the medial prefrontal cortex (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Gusnard et al., 2001; 
Kelley et al., 2002). Both past and future event constructions are strongly dependent on visual 
mental imagery, which increases the number of details retrieved and the subjective sense of 
remembering (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003), attributable to activity in the precuneus (Cavanna 
& Trimble, 2006; Fletcher et al., 1995). The ability to visualize complex spatial scenes is also 
necessary to mentally construct past or future events, reliant on activity in the posterior 
cingulate cortex (Hassabis et al., 2007b; Szpunar et al., 2007, 2009). Past and future 
representations require the binding of details into a coherent event mediated by the medial 
temporal lobe, including the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, 2001). Its role in recombining details 
of past events during episodic autobiographical recollection has been shown previously (Viard 
et al., 2007, 2010) and extended to novel integration of details into coherent future events 
(Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).  
Different hypotheses have been proposed to account for this common core network. On 
one hand, Buckner and Carroll (2007) speculate that self-projection (i.e., the ability to 
mentally project oneself from the immediate present into a simulation of another time, place 
or perspective) may underlie the common brain network shared by past and future thinking, 
and other cognitive domains (theory of mind and navigation). A complementary idea, the 
“constructive episodic simulation hypothesis” formulated by Schacter and Addis (2007), 
posits that past and future events build on similar information stored in episodic memory and 
rely on similar cognitive processes (i.e., self-referential processing, imagery and flexible 
recombination of stored details). Novel events could, hence, be generated by reassembling 
and flexibly recombining stored event details. On the other hand, Hassabis and Maguire 
(2007) show that imagination, which may not depend on self-related nor on time-related 
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processes, relies on the same brain regions. They propose that scene construction (i.e., the 
process of mentally generating and maintaining a complex and coherent scene or event) may 
better explain the commonalities in the brain areas engaged. 
Although sharing remarkable similarities, both at the cognitive and neural level, past and 
future events obviously differ in that past events represent real experiences, while future 
events are based on predictions and estimations, reflected by differences at the 
phenomenological level. Past events contain more visual and other sensory details than future 
events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Addis et al., 2008; Anderson & 
Dewhurst, 2009), in line with the “reality monitoring framework” which posits that memories 
of real events include more sensory and contextual details than memories for imagined events 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, 1991; Conway et al., 2002). Moreover, participants 
experience past events with a clearer representation of contextual (spatial and temporal) 
information, with a more coherent story, and perceive the event more from a field perspective 
compared to future events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). Conversely, future 
simulations are rated as being more positive and personally significant compared to past 
events, indicating the existence of an optimistic bias towards the future (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2006; Sharot et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2008). Past and future evocations also 
change as people get older and, although all age groups produce intentions, those of older 
people take place closer to the present, become less frequent as time from present increases 
(Spreng & Levine, 2006) and tend to contain less episodic details than younger adults (Addis 
et al., 2008). Up to now, no study has yet compared brain activation during past and future 
thinking in older people.  
In this study, we used functional imaging to examine brain activations while projecting 
into the past or the future, in an older population. In the scanner, upon presentation of a cue-
phrase prompting a specific past or future event (obtained by questioning a close family 
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member), participants were asked to mentally recall specific events from the past 12 months 
and specific plans they intended to pursue in the next 12 months. Our first aim was to assess 
whether past and future thinking shared common neural bases in healthy aged people. Our 
second aim was to determine, if a neural overlap was observed, how it could be explained by 
the phenomenological quality of the events produced. Debriefing was particularly thorough as 
past and future mental evocations were rated on a five-point episodic scale, as well as on the 
mental strategy used, the quality and number of mental images retrieved, perspective taken, 
emotional intensity and valence. To test the idea of mental time travel in subjective time and 
examine the influence of retrospective thinking, additional scales not previously used in 
neuroimaging studies examining the future evaluated the state of consciousness, frequency of 
rehearsal and recency of last evocation.  
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
Twelve right-handed (as measured by the Edinburgh handedness inventory) healthy 
females (mean age ± SD = 67.2 ± 5.2 years; ranging from 60 to 75 years old) with no history 
of psychiatric or neurological disorder were recruited through a university, a retirement 
association or a newspaper advertisement. To obtain a homogeneous group, we recruited only 
females. Indeed, gender-related differences have been shown to affect both the behavioural 
(Goddard et al., 2005) and neural levels (Piefke & Fink, 2005) of autobiographical 
recollection. The study was approved by the Regional Ethics Committee and written informed 
consent was obtained from all subjects prior to their participation in the study. Participants 
had no abnormality on their T1-weighted high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). 
They underwent a battery of neuropsychological tests to assess their cognitive abilities and all 
performed in the normal range (see Viard et al., 2007, for a full description). Each participant 
resided at home and all were active in cultural pursuits, continuing education or with 
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responsibilities in diverse associations. The present data were obtained as part of a broader 
experiment exploring five past periods previously published (Viard et al., 2007, 2010). Here, 
we present new results concerning the future period (next 12 months) and compare them to 
the mirroring past period (i.e., past 12 months). 
 
Task and experimental design 
A few weeks before the scanning session, a close family member was interviewed on the 
participant’s specific life events and future plans. On the day of the scanning session, a 
training period preceded the functional scan which was followed by a debriefing. Personal 
sentence-cues were elaborated from the family member’s prior interview and cues were 
visually presented in white on a black background, using Superlab software (3.0 version, 
Cedrus). Upon presentation of the visual cue, participants were instructed to recall or envision 
a specific detailed event, unique in time and space, that had either occurred in the past 12 
months (past period, PP) or was scheduled in the next 12 months (future period, FP). For both 
past and future events, they were asked to experience the event with as much details as 
possible. The functional runs, one per time-period, were composed of five experimental and 
five control blocks, randomly intermixed across subjects. In the experimental condition, 
participants viewed sentence-cues (5 seconds) followed by a blank screen (19 seconds) during 
which they had to mentally experience the corresponding specific personal event (e.g., past: 
my grandson’s last birthday party; future: my fifty-third wedding anniversary). Since they 
could start their mental evocation while the cue was still on the screen, the maximum retrieval 
time was 24 seconds per block. They were asked to press on a button as soon as they gained 
access to the prompted event.  
In the control condition, participants were asked to detect the presence of two consecutive 
letters (“mb”) in a pseudo-word of six letters (for example, “speugr” or “mbieha”) and were 
instructed to press on a button when “mb” was present in the pseudo-word (i.e., target word). 
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This low-level task was chosen as a baseline condition in order to control for reading 
operations, mental processing of visual cues and motor processing, common to both 
experimental and control tasks. Five pseudo-words were presented in each control block (1 
second for cue presentation, followed by 3.8 seconds for the response) and one out of the five 
was a target word. Thus, each control block lasted 24 seconds (i.e., 5 x (1 + 3.8) seconds). 
The position of target words was randomly intermixed across blocks. Overall, in both 
experimental and control blocks, cue presentation (i.e., reading) lasted five seconds and only 
one key-press was required per block. 
Following the scanning session, a debriefing took place in which participants verbally 
described all events retrieved in the scanner and rated them on behavioral scales. Such a 
procedure is widely used in neuroimaging studies of autobiographical memory and proves to 
be a successful method to evaluate the nature of the events recalled in the scanner (Maguire & 
Frith, 2003; Gilboa et al., 2004; Rekkas & Constable, 2005; Steinvorth et al., 2006; Gardini et 
al., 2006; Nadel et al., 2007; Daselaar et al., 2008; Piolino et al., 2004, 2008; Viard et al., 
2007, 2010). First, the episodic nature of the events was rated by the investigator on a five-
point scale taking into account the specificity of the content (single or repeated event), the 
spatiotemporal situation and the presence of details (perceptions, thoughts, feelings) (Piolino 
et al., 2004; Viard et al., 2007, 2010). This scale not only distinguishes specific from generic 
events, but also separates episodic (specific without any details, but situated in time and 
space) from strictly episodic events (specific with sensory details situated in time and space). 
A specific event with sensory details situated in time and space was given a score of 4. A 
specific event without any details but situated in time and space was scored 3. A repeated or 
extended event was scored 2 if it was situated in time and space or 1 if it was not. An absence 
of event, or only general information about a theme, was scored 0. The strictly episodic score 
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(EM) was recorded per time-period, taking into account the number of specific and detailed 
memories scoring 4 (maximum per time-period 4 x 5 = 20). 
Second, in order to specify the different aspects of the recollective experience, participants 
were asked to rate their evocations on several analogical scales (10-cm lines; subjective 
measurement) known to be crucial to control the degree of episodic re-experiencing (Viard et 
al., 2007, 2010; Piolino et al., 2004, 2009). These scales evaluated visual mental imagery, 
emotional intensity and valence, state of consciousness, frequency of rehearsal and recency of 
the last evocation. More specifically, it has previously been shown that visual mental imagery 
increases the recall of specific details (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Brewer, 1996; Rubin et 
al., 2003). Thus, participants had to rate the mental strategy used during retrieval (verbal or 
visual), the mental image quality, the number of mental images retrieved and the point of view 
(field or observer; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). In the “field” perspective, mental images represent 
the scene from the point of view from which it was originally experienced, while in the 
“observer” perspective, mental images represent the original scene as an external observer 
might have seen it. The “field” perspective characterizes episodic recollection (Crawley & 
French, 2005; Piolino et al., 2006). Emotion is also an important phenomenological 
characteristic of vivid autobiographical memories (Brewer, 1988; Dolan et al., 2000) and 
affects both past and future mental evocations (Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007b; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Sharot et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2010). Participants were asked to 
rate their productions on scales measuring emotional intensity and valence.  
We added other scales not previously used in neuroimaging studies examining the future 
to further explore the phenomenology of past and future mental evocations and more specially 
the involvement of retrospective thinking into the future. The state of consciousness can be 
distinguished by the Remember/Know (R/K) procedure which has been previously used both 
in laboratory (Gardiner, 2001 for a review) or real-world (Piolino et al., 2009 for a review) 
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investigations of episodic memory. The autonoetic state (R) characterizes episodic memory, 
while the noetic state (K) characterizes semantic memory (Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988; 
Gardiner & Java, 1993). Unlike the “knowing” state, the “remembering” state is characterized 
by phenomenal elements associated with the recall of specific events (visual images, 
sensations, feelings). For the future, an R response indicates that subjects remember to have 
thought about their plan via a feeling of recollection. Participants were asked to rate their 
productions on a scale measuring the state of consciousness between the autonoetic and noetic 
states. Note that four subjects were uncomfortable to rate their state of consciousness relative 
to the future period, hence analyses for this scale were run over eight subjects. Several authors 
have demonstrated the influence of repetition on autobiographical memories (talking or 
thinking about the same event), leading to a reinforcement of specific details (Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995) or to a decontextualization or semantization of memories (Brewer, 1986; 
Linton, 1986, 1988; Cermak, 1984). We controlled for recent reactivation by evaluating if 
past or future events had been thought about recently or not, using two analogical scales. The 
frequency of rehearsal evaluates how frequently each event was rehearsed prior to scanning, if 
it was the case, and the recency of the last evocation evaluates when each event was last 
evoked. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
A blocked functional MRI design was used. Lying in the scanner, participants viewed the 
display via a mirror to an active matrix video projector. Stimulus onset was synchronized with 
the acquisition of the first slice. Anatomical and functional MRIs were acquired on a General 
Electrics Signa 1.5 tesla MRI scanner (GE, BUC, France). First, a high-resolution T1-
weighted MRI scan (T1-MRI) was acquired with a three-dimensional inversion recovery 
spoiled gradient echo sequence (matrix size = 256 x 256 x 128; slice thickness = 1.5 mm). 
Second, a proton density/T2-weighted MRI scan (PD-MRI, T2-MRI) was acquired with 32 
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axial slices covering the entire brain and the superior part of the cerebellum (slice thickness = 
3.8 mm). Finally, functional images were acquired with echo planar imaging blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) sequence (repetition time = 6 s, echo time = 60 ms, flip angle = 90°, 
matrix size = 64 x 64 x 32, 50 volumes, 3.8-mm-thick slices) covering the same field of view 
as the T2-MRI acquisition. 
 
Construction of an old-adult template 
Using voxel-based morphometry (VBM; Good et al., 2001), each individual T1-MRIs 
were segmented according to the unified segmentation procedure (Ashburner and Friston, 
2005) with spatial normalization included. Mean templates were calculated based on the 
individual segmented and normalized T1-MRIs, creating three separate old-adult templates 
according to tissue type (i.e., grey and white matters, cerebro-spinal fluid) which were then 
spatially smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Coordinates are reported in the 
MNI stereotaxic space. 
 
Functional image pre-processing 
Functional images were processed and analyzed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping 
software (SPM5; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spml). The first six volumes of the functional acquisition were 
discarded, allowing for signal stabilization, and differences in slice acquisition timing were 
corrected. Images were realigned to correct for interscan movement with the creation of 
resliced mean functional volumes (mean-fMRI). For inter-modalities registration, rigid 
registration matrices (mean-fMRI onto T2-MRI, PD-MRI onto T1-MRI, T1-MRI onto the 
old-adult template) were computed, combined and then applied to fMRI volumes. Individual 
T1-MRIs were then segmented using the old-adult templates as priors (obtained previously, 
one for each tissue type; see above) and normalized. In order to set the fMRI volumes into our 
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old-adult space, functional MRI images were resampled using the normalization parameters 
obtained in the segmentation step. Finally, data were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm
3
 
FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
 
Behavioral data analysis 
A repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to behavioral scores, 
followed by post hoc tests [protected least significant differences (PLSD) Fisher], to examine 
the influence of the time-period. To better delineate what best characterized episodicity of 
past and future evocations (i.e., events scored 4, EM), stepwise regression analyses were 
conducted to study the relationships between the strictly episodic score (EM) and the 
analogical scales.  
 
fMRI data analysis 
In the basic model, fMRI time series were modelled by a general linear model (GLM) 
including separate regressors for each of the experimental (past and future periods) and 
control conditions using SPM5. All regressors were convolved with the canonical 
hemodynamic response function (HRF). Data were high-pass filtered (cut-off period = 96s). 
Coefficients for each regressor were estimated for each participant using maximum likelihood 
estimates to account for serial correlations in the data. At the first level, linear contrasts of the 
parameter estimates for each “experimental” regressor of interest were calculated for each 
participant, subtracting the corresponding “control” regressor (resulting in “period minus 
control” contrasts). These contrasts were then brought to the second level random effects 
analysis, across all subjects, applying the paired t-test model of SPM5. First, a conjunction 
analysis was performed to detect cerebral regions commonly activated by both past and future 
time-periods. In this test, all the comparisons in the conjunction are individually significant 
which corresponds to the valid test for a “logical AND” (Nichols et al., 2005). Second, 
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subtraction analyses were computed to determine which regions were differentially activated 
when comparing both time-periods. We report activations at an uncorrected statistical 
threshold of p < 0.001, k > 15 voxels. Coordinates of brain regions are reported in the MNI 
space. 
In order to determine which brain region best explained the episodic nature of past and 
future thinking (as assessed by the EM score), voxel-based regression analyses were carried 
out for past and future periods separately between the EM score and whole brain activations. 
For each time-period (past or future), voxel-by-voxel positive regression analyses were 
launched across the 12 subjects between the EM scores and contrast images of the 
corresponding time-period obtained at the first-level (see above). The threshold was set at p < 
0.005 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, k > 15 voxels. 
 
Results 
Behavioral results 
Behavioral results indicate that events from both past and future periods were comparable 
in terms of the strategy used (massively visual) and viewpoint of mental images (principally 
field), emotional intensity and valence, frequency of rehearsal and recency of the last 
evocation. In contrast, past memories were rated as more episodic (based on the EM score), 
were recalled with a higher state of autonoetic consciousness and had a better image quality 
and a higher number of mental images compared to future events (see Table 1). Final results 
of the forward stepwise regression analysis showed that the best predictors for the strictly 
episodic score (EM) when recalling past events were mental visual image quality (explaining 
49.2% of the variance) and a field perspective (explaining 21% of the variance). The best 
predictor for the EM score when envisioning future events was a field perspective (explaining 
22% of the variance). 
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fMRI results 
Conjunction analysis 
The conjunction analysis revealed a bilateral parieto-fronto-temporal network commonly 
active when recalling past or future events (see Table 2 and Figure 1), including the posterior 
cingulate cortex (BAs 23, 30), precuneus (BA 7), angular gyrus (BA 39), middle (BAs 8, 6, 
9), superior (BAs 8) and inferior (BA 47) frontal gyri, superior (BAs 38, 22) and middle (BA 
21) temporal gyri, left hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36), a visuo-spatial 
region (calcarine sulcus, BA 17), thalamus and cerebellum. Activation in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (BAs 32, 10) and right hippocampus appeared subthreshold (at punc<0.005).  
 
Subtraction analyses 
Subtraction analyses revealed mainly higher parietal activation for future compared to past 
events (see Table 3), localized in the inferior (BA 40) and superior (BA 7) parietal gyri, 
angular gyrus (BA 39) and cerebellar activation extending into visuo-spatial areas (lingual 
gyrus, BA 18). No difference appeared for past compared to future events. 
 
Regression analyses 
Results of the regression analyses between the episodic score (EM) and brain activations 
were all positive and showed that, for the past, EM depended on activation in the right middle 
occipital gyrus (BA 19), right hippocampus, left angular gyrus (BA 39), posterior cingulate 
cortex (BA 30), thalamus and insula (see Table 4). For the future, EM depended on activation 
in the left inferior frontal gyrus (BAs 45, 44), bilateral superior temporal gyrus (BAs 42, 21, 
22), precuneus (BA 31) and thalamus. 
 
Discussion 
We used fMRI to explore the cerebral structures recruited by healthy aged subjects when 
thinking about personal specific events from the past 12 months (past) and the next 12 months 
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(future), in an attempt to answer two main questions. First, do past and future thinking share a 
common neural basis in healthy aged adults? Second, if a neural overlap is present, how can it 
be explained by the phenomenological quality of the events produced? Neuroimaging results 
revealed a bilateral parieto-fronto-temporal network, including medial temporal areas, 
commonly active when recalling past or future events, suggesting that past and future thinking 
build on the same cerebral underpinnings, as found in the literature on younger adults (see 
introduction). Original behavioral measures helped us further understand these neural 
commonalities indicating that past and future events were comparable in terms of the 
frequency of rehearsal and recency of the last evocation. Past and future events were also 
comparable on certain phenomenological qualities (mental visual strategy, emotional intensity 
and valence). However, most strikingly, past events were more episodic (i.e., contained more 
details), were retrieved with a higher state of autonoetic consciousness and mental visual 
images were clearer and more numerous than for future events. Subtraction analyses mainly 
revealed hyperactivation in the posterior parietal cortex for future events compared to past 
events. When investigating further the episodic quality of both types of events, regressions 
analyses revealed that the episodic nature of past memories was particularly dependent on 
activation in the right hippocampus and visuo-spatial areas (occipital and angular gyri, 
posterior cingulate cortex), while the episodic nature of future thoughts depended mainly on 
inferior frontal and superior temporal areas. We will, first, discuss how the common neural 
network between past and future thinking can be explained by common cognitive processes 
and, second, discuss how the episodic distinction between past and future thinking can be 
linked to a differential engagement of specific areas within this common neural network. 
 
Cognitive and neural overlap underlying mental time travel  
Activation was detected in the posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus and medial prefrontal 
cortex (albeit subthreshold) for both past and future events, regions belonging to the cortical 
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midline structures (CMS) which play a role in self-referential processes (Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004) and are hypothesized to mediate self-projection in time, whether in the past 
or in the future (Hassabis et al., 2007b; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007, 2009). The 
precuneus is also associated with access to sensory-perceptual details via its role in visual 
mental imagery and the posterior cingulate cortex is recruited when mentally visualizing 
complex spatial contexts (see introduction). This interpretation is further confirmed by our 
behavioral data which indicate that participants preferentially used a visual strategy to retrieve 
past and future events. An overlap between both time-periods was also detected in the 
occipital cortex known for its role in visuo-spatial processes. It is likely that to envision future 
events, participants reactivated previously experienced visuo-spatial contexts and placed their 
mental images of future events in familiar contexts (Szpunar et al., 2007, 2009; D’Argembeau 
& Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Schacter and Addis, 2007). Our behavioral data further 
indicate that mental images were visualized from a field perspective for both time-periods, 
indicating that participants projected themselves in time and visualized past and future events 
as if they were re-experiencing or pre-experiencing them from a first person perspective. This 
perspective is known to be closely connected to emotional context and current self (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983; Libby & Eibach, 2002). 
Activation in the middle and superior frontal gyri was detected for both past and future 
thinking, in line with other studies in younger adults (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; 
Botzung et al., 2008; Abraham et al., 2008; Weiler et al., 2010). Left-lateralized inferior 
frontal gyrus (or ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in another terminology; BA 47) is involved in 
the controlled retrieval of semantic information (Raposo et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2003; for 
review, Badre and Wagner, 2007) and in more elaborate cue-specification strategies (Petrides, 
2002) necessary to retrieve episodic AMs (Piolino et al., 2008) and past and future events 
(Addis et al., 2007). The middle frontal gyrus (or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in another 
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terminology; BAs 8, 6) would help to manipulate the products of retrieval in working memory 
(Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007) and could also have a role in the recollection of the temporal 
context of episodic core information for both past and future events (Botzung et al., 2008).  
Activation in the hippocampus was also detected for both past and future thinking. Much 
evidence links the hippocampus to episodic autobiographical memory retrieval (for reviews, 
Maguire, 2001; Svoboda et al., 2006; Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Piolino et al., 2009). Here, 
we show that its role extends to the anticipation of future events in older subjects, as found in 
the literature on younger adults (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007b; 
Botzung et al., 2008; Abraham et al., 2008). The hippocampus plays a critical role in binding 
disparate details together (see introduction) necessary to construct coherent scenes of the past 
and the future (Hassabis et al., 2007b; Addis et al., 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2010), ability 
which is strongly impaired in hippocampally-lesioned patients (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 
2002; Hassabis et al., 2007a). For the past, it would serve to reactivate and reintegrate details 
of a memory bound together at encoding and, for the future, hippocampal activity would 
reflect the integration of disparate details into a novel future event (Addis et al., 2007). 
How can we explain this common neural network? Past and future thinking both depend 
on the episodic memory system which enables mental time travel (Tulving, 2002). As stated 
above, it is likely that aspects of previously experienced events are used to envision the future, 
hence explaining the neural overlap between both processes. The present study offers an 
additional explanation. In our experiment, participants were asked to project themselves in a 
particular moment of future plans they intended to fulfill in the next 12 months. Although 
prior to the experiment, they had not thought or talked in detail about specific events 
concerning these future prospects, these projects were nonetheless planned in the past (see 
also other studies where participants thought about future events which were planned in the 
past: Okuda et al., 2003; Botzung et al., 2008; Weiler et al., 2010; Peters & Büchel, 2010). 
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Accordingly, behavioral data indicate that past and future events were comparable in terms of 
frequency of rehearsal and recency of the last evocation. Thus, another possible explanation 
for the common neural network observed when thinking about the past or the future is that 
when planning an event beforehand, a future event automatically adopts a retrospective form 
and thinking about it reactivates the same network as the one recruited when remembering the 
past. Our results highlight the neural network recruited by the retrospective component of 
future thinking as suggested by Schacter and Addis (2007). Indeed, the “constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis” of future events proposes that the simulation of future episodes 
requires recombining details from past events (retrospective component) into novel scenarios 
(prospective component). Schacter and collaborators, however, have studied the quality of 
past and future events. In the present work, we have added quantitative measures of past and 
future mental evocation (through various behavioral measures). 
 
Phenomenological differences between past and future thinking 
Although sharing a common neural network, our data show that past and future events 
differed phenomenologically. Past events were more episodic than future events based on the 
EM score. Since this score takes into account the number of phenomenological details 
retrieved, it indicates that past events were more detailed than future events, like reported 
previously in younger adults (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Addis et al., 
2008). Memories of past experiences contain more sensorial and contextual details than 
representations of the future likely due to the fact that past representations reflect real 
experiences, while future events are based on projections or simulations (i.e., imagination; see 
introduction on “reality monitoring framework”). This probably also explains why a higher 
state of autonoetic consciousness (based on the R/K paradigm) was observed when recalling 
past events compared to future events. The remembering state, reflecting autonoetic 
consciousness, characterizes the retrieval of specific events (for the future, it would entail that 
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subjects remember thinking about their plans or are able to live future events in advance) 
accompanied by phenomenal elements (visual images, sensations feelings). Past events were 
indeed retrieved with a higher number of mental images and their quality was clearer 
compared to future events. Overall, although past and future events share a common neural 
network, they are nevertheless distinguishable at the phenomenal level, in terms of level of 
details, state of consciousness and number and quality of mental images.  
To further investigate the episodic distinction between past and future events at the neural 
level, regression analyses were conducted to examine which brain region best predicted the 
strictly episodic score EM. For the past, results showed that EM depended on activation in the 
right hippocampus, posterior cingulate cortex, occipital and angular gyri. The latter regions 
are involved in visuo-spatial processing which promotes the retrieval of episodic 
autobiographical events (see introduction). The right hippocampus is particularly responsive 
to the sense of reliving the encoding context (Graham et al., 2003; Gilboa et al., 2004; Piolino 
et al., 2004, 2008; Steinvorth et al., 2006) in particular by providing the spatial context 
necessary to retrieve episodic memories (Burgess et al., 2002). Behaviorally, the best 
predictors of EM for past events were the quality of mental visual images and a field 
perspective, in which mental visual images represent the scene from its original point of view, 
indicating that the retrieval of the spatial context of past memories is critical for episodic 
recollection. We previously reported that the right hippocampus was recruited, in addition to 
its left counterpart, when retrieving phenomenologically rich episodic memories (Viard et al., 
2007, 2010) requiring the integration of disparate details (see above) and the field point of 
view (Piolino et al., 2009). Overall, the episodic quality of past events is best explained by 
activity of regions implicated in recollection, either through their role in extracting the visuo-
spatial contexts of events or in binding together disparate phenomenological elements.  
Viard et al. 
 20 
For the future, the EM score depended principally on activation in regions involved in the 
retrieval of semantic information, namely the left inferior frontal gyrus, previously shown to 
be recruited in future event construction, and the lateral temporal cortex, involved in future 
event elaboration (Addis et al., 2007). Behaviorally, future events were not as episodic as past 
events and subtraction analyses revealed higher activation within the lateral temporal cortex 
(involved in semantic processing) for future compared to past events. It has previously been 
suggested that future thinking reactivates acquired semantic knowledge (Okuda et al., 2003) 
or personal semantic information (Addis et al., 2007) which serve as an effective guideline to 
construct future events. The EM score also depended on activation in the precuneus, 
implicated in visual mental imagery (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Fletcher et al., 1995). 
Envisioning the visuo-spatial aspects of future events probably helped in rendering them more 
episodic, although they were still not as episodic as past events, as confirmed by the 
behavioral data.  
Furthermore, subtraction analyses revealed higher activation in the posterior parietal 
cortex (both inferior and superior gyri) for future compared to past events (see also Addis et 
al., 2007). This region has been hypothesized to play a role in attentional processes, both 
bottom-up attention (“capture of attentional resources by relevant memory cues”) via the 
inferior parietal gyrus and top-down attention (“allocation of attentional resources to memory 
retrieval according to the goals of the rememberer”) via the superior parietal gyrus (Cabeza, 
2008; Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008). It is plausible that future thinking engages 
higher attentional resources than past remembering in order to merge temporal projection and 
different types of information (personal semantic information and episodic details from 
distinct memory traces) and flexibly recombine them into coherent future events. Note that 
the conjunction analysis showed that both past and future events elicited activation in the 
posterior parietal cortex (inferior and superior parietal gyri). Hence, top-down and bottom-up 
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attentional processes appear during past and future thinking, but they are enhanced during 
future thinking which requires higher attentional demands. Overall, the episodic distinction 
between past and future events at the behavioral level can be explained at the neuronal level 
by a differential recruitment of specific regions within the common core brain network 
underlying mental time travel into the past or the future. 
 
Conclusion 
This study showed that thinking about the past and the future recruits the same set of 
brains regions in healthy aged subjects reflecting the use of similar cognitive processes (visual 
imagery, semantic retrieval, episodic binding). When planning a future event beforehand, 
thinking retrospectively about it engaged the same regions as those recruited when thinking 
about a past event. However, past and future events differed on certain phenomenological 
aspects: past events were more episodic (i.e., contained more details), engaged a higher state 
of autonoetic consciousness and mental visual images were clearer and more numerous 
compared to future events. Regression analyses showed that the episodic nature of past events 
was particularly dependent on activation in the right hippocampus (critical in episodic 
recollection) and visuo-spatial areas (implicated in the retrieval of the spatial context of 
events), while the episodic nature of future events was dependent on the inferior frontal and 
lateral temporal gyri (involved in semantic retrieval). Furthermore, future events elicited 
greater activation in parietal regions compared to past events, reflecting the use of higher 
attentional resources to envision future scenarios. Although sharing common neural 
processes, past and future thinking differed most notably at the episodic level, likely due to 
the fact that past events have actually happened, while future events are mental constructions.  
An obvious follow-up of the present study would be to directly compare brain activity 
between young and old adults during past and future thinking, to pinpoint the similarities and 
differences at the neural level. It would also be particularly appealing to compare future 
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planning with imagination in aging, i.e. distinguish events that will really occur in the future 
from those that are mere figments of the imagination, to examine the impact of realness of 
future events on brain activity. As selective positive mental self projection into time seems to 
be an important part of well-being in aging (see Carstensen, Fung, Charles, 2003), future 
studies would be interesting to explore the specificity of the cerebral network which maintains 
a positive sense of ourselves as a single entity with a subjective continuity in aging despite 
changes. 
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Table 1: Behavioral results of the ANOVA applied on all behavioral scores for the past and 
future periods (mean ± S.D.) and post hoc analyses [PLSD Fisher tests] showing the effect of 
time-period. 
 
Behavioral score Past Future p 
EM 0.80 (± 0.27) 0.43 (± 0.33) 0.0086* 
Frequency of rehearsal 5.51 (± 1.99) 4.11 (± 2.55) ns 
Last evocation 1.67 (± 0.91) 1.63 (±1.45) ns 
Emotional intensity at retrieval 5.09 (± 1.59) 4.46 (±1.97) ns 
Emotional valence at retrieval 6.57 (± 1.26) 6.72 (±0.89) ns 
State of consciousness
**
 9.23 (± 0.69) 6.28 (±3.47) 0.038* 
Mental strategy used 8.65 (± 1.83) 8.86 (±1.69) ns 
Mental visual image quality 9.13 (± 1.25) 7.55 (± 1.56) 0.0013* 
Number of mental visual 
images 
5.06 (± 2.12) 3.17 (±1.52) 0.0005* 
Point of view 1.40 (± 0.59) 1.14 (±0.77) ns 
 
* post hoc analyses indicate that Past > Future 
** N = 8 
Abbreviations: EM = strictly episodic score; ns = non significant. 
 
EM is expressed in terms of ratio of strictly episodic memories per period (i.e., number of 
strictly episodic memories divided by the number of memories). Analogical scales range from 
0 to 10 for the frequency of rehearsal (0 = never to 10 = very frequent), last evocation (0 = 
today to 10 = over 10 years ago), emotional intensity at retrieval (0 = no emotion to 10 = very 
strong emotion), emotional valence at retrieval (0 = very negative to 10 = very positive), state 
of consciousness (0 = knowing to 10 = remembering), mental strategy used (0 = verbal to 10 
= visual), number of mental visual images (0 = no images to 10 = over 10 images), mental 
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visual image quality (0 = very blurry to 10 = very clear. For the point of view, the maximum 
score is 2 (0 = observer; 1 = field and observer; 2 = field). 
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Table 2: Results of the conjunction analysis, specifying for each peak the Brodmann area(s) 
(BA), side, cluster size (k), Z score, and MNI coordinates (x y z) at punc < 0.001, cluster-level 
k > 15 voxels. 
 
Regions BA Side k Z score x y z 
PCC/precuneus 23 L 3880 6.18 -16 -58 14 
 30 R  5.27 8 -52 12 
 7 L  5.20 -2 -64 42 
Middle frontal gyrus 8 L 1273 5.64 -36 10 46 
 6 L  4.83 -36 18 54 
 6 L  4.63 2 12 50 
 6 R 32 3.68 32 16 52 
 9 R 17 3.49 34 8 36 
Superior frontal gyrus 8 L 57 4.16 -18 40 50 
 8 R 13 3.70 26 50 38 
Superior medial frontal gyrus 8/32 L 40 3.54* -12 26 34 
 10 L 23 3.00* -16 54 20 
Inferior frontal gyrus 47 L 32 3.48 -38 26 -12 
 47 R 15 3.45 36 38 -4 
Angular gyrus 39 R 386 5.28 46 -72 36 
 39 L 747 4.95 -46 -66 32 
Superior temporal gyrus 38 R 24 4.55 58 -6 -10 
 22 R 23 3.50 44 -36 4 
Middle temporal gyrus 21 L 152 4.12 -60 -10 -8 
Fusiform gyrus 36 L 35 5.18 -38 -60 -22 
Hippocampus  L 17 3.62 -14 -20 -12 
  R 13 3.21* 16 -18 -12 
Parahippocampal gyrus 36 L 17 3.51 -22 -38 -12 
Cerebellum  R 916 6.46 16 -78 -16 
Vermis  L  5.63 -2 -76 -18 
Cerebellum  R 46 4.15 36 -58 -24 
Thalamus  L 21 4.01 -2 -16 -2 
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  R  3.20 2 -20 -10 
Calcarine sulcus 17 L 20 3.71 -8 -82 10 
 
* punc < 0.005 
Abbreviations: PCC: posterior cingulate cortex 
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Table 3 : Results of the subtraction analysis (Future > Past), specifying for each peak the 
Brodmann area(s) (BA), side, cluster size (k), Z score, and MNI coordinates (x y z) at punc < 
0.001, cluster-level k > 15 voxels. 
 
Regions BA Side k Z score x y z 
Inferior parietal gyrus 40 L 101 4.83 -48 -56 42 
Angular gyrus 39 L  3.66 -54 -54 32 
Cerebellum  R 29 4.11 16 -78 -16 
Fusiform gyrus 19 R  3.29 28 -78 -6 
Vermis  R 25 3.76 0 -74 -12 
Lingual gyrus 18 R  3.47 8 -76 -10 
Superior parietal gyrus 7 L 25 3.62 -22 -72 58 
Middle temporal gyrus 37/21 R 11 3.39 44 -66 6 
Cuneus 19 R 11 3.42 22 -56 36 
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Table 4: Results of the regression analyses between the EM score and brain activation values, 
for the past and future periods, specifying the Brodmann area(s) (BA), side, cluster size (k), Z 
score, and MNI coordinates (x y z) at punc < 0.005, k > 15 voxels. 
 
 Regions BA Side k Z score x y z 
EM 
Past 
Middle occipital gyrus 19 R 58 4.70 52 -70 24 
Hippocampus  R 120 3.25 30 -38 -4 
Angular gyrus 39 L 74 3.24 -42 -66 26 
PCC 30 L 35 3.07 -12 -56 12 
Thalamus  R 15 3.02 18 -18 6 
Insula  L 23 3.00 -32 -16 18 
        
EM 
Future 
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 L 94 3.58 -46 24 14 
 44 L  3.28 -50 10 8 
 44 L  2.95 -42 14 8 
Superior temporal gyrus 42 R 69 3.37 44 -22 10 
  21 R  3.30 48 -18 2 
  22 L 22 2.98 -46 -14 2 
 Precuneus 31 R 20 2.88 22 -62 24 
 Thalamus  R 16 3.02 14 -18 16 
 
Abbreviations: PCC: posterior cingulate cortex 
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Figure 1: Statistical parametric maps depicting the results of the conjunction analysis 
showing regions commonly active for past and future periods. Stereotaxic coordinates are 
given on Table 2.  For representational purposes, the coronal slice (far right) is thresholded at 
punc<0.005 to depict the bilateral hippocampal activation. 
 
 
 
